A Human Rights First Report

Command.s

Responsibility

Written by Hina Shamsi and Edited by Deborah Pearlstein

February 2006

I. Introduction................................................................ 1

II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force ......... 5

Twelve Individual Cases Profiled.................... 6

III. Death by Officially Unknown, .Natural.

or Other Causes.................................................... 21

Nine Individual Cases Profiled......................21

IV. Failures in Investigation ........................................ 29

V. Failure of Accountability......................................... 35

VI. The Path Ahead .................................................... 41

VII. Appendices .......................................................... 43

VIII. Endnotes.......................................................... 103

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Human Rights First is a leading human rights advocacy organization

based in New York City and Washington, DC. Since 1978, we

have worked in the United States and abroad to create a secure

and humane world – advancing justice, human dignity, and

respect for the rule of law. All of our activities are supported by

private contributions. We accept no government funds.

This report was written by Hina Shamsi and edited by

Deborah Pearlstein.

Others who contributed to the report are Maureen Byrnes,

Avi Cover, Miriam Datskovsky, Ken Hurwitz, Allison Johnson,

Priti Patel, Michael Posner, and Lauren Smith. Michael Russo

made substantial contributions at all stages of research and

report-writing.

Human Rights First would like to thank the many former military

officers and other experts who generously provided insights on

aspects of the report.

Human Rights First gratefully acknowledges the generous support

of the following: Anonymous (2); Arca Foundation; The Atlantic

Philanthropies; The David Berg Foundation; Joan K. Davidson

(The J.M. Kaplan Fund); Charles Lawrence Keith and Clara Miller

Foundation; The Elysium Foundation; FJC – A Foundation of Donor

Advised Funds; Florence Baker Martineau Foundation;

Ford Foundation; The Arthur Helton Fellowship; Herb Block

Foundation; JEHT Foundation; John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur

Foundation; John Merck Fund; The Kaplen Foundation; Merlin

Foundation; Open Society Institute; The Overbrook Foundation;

Puget Sound Fund of Tides Foundation; Rhodebeck Charitable

Trust; The Paul D. Schurgot Foundation, Inc.; TAUPO Community

Fund of Tides Foundation; The Oak Foundation.

Cover design: Sarah Graham

Cover photo: Mark Wilson/Getty Images

John D. Hutson

Rear Admiral (Ret.), JAGC, USN

David R. Irvine

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) USA

Command.s Responsibility . 1

A Human Rights First Report

U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales

Confirmation Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee

January 6, 2005

Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer

Testifying during his Court Martial for Death of Iraqi General Abed Hamed Mowhoush

January 19, 2006

Since August 2002, nearly 100 detainees have died

while in the hands of U.S. officials in the global .war on

terror.. According to the U.S. military.s own classifications,

34 of these cases are suspected or confirmed

homicides; Human Rights First has identified another

11 in which the facts suggest death as a result of

physical abuse or harsh conditions of detention. In

close to half the deaths Human Rights First surveyed,

the cause of death remains officially undetermined or

unannounced. Overall, eight people in U.S. custody

were tortured to death.

Despite these numbers, four years since the first known

death in U.S. custody, only 12 detainee deaths have

resulted in punishment of any kind for any U.S. official.

Of the 34 homicide cases so far identified by the

military, investigators recommended criminal charges in

fewer than two thirds, and charges were actually

brought (based on decisions made by command) in

less than half. While the CIA has been implicated in

several deaths, not one CIA agent has faced a criminal

charge. Crucially, among the worst cases in this list .

those of detainees tortured to death . only half have

resulted in punishment; the steepest sentence for

anyone involved in a torture-related death: five months

in jail.

It is difficult to assess the systemic adequacy of

punishment when so few have been punished, and

when the deliberations of juries and commanders are

largely unknown. Nonetheless, two patterns clearly

emerge: (1) because of investigative and evidentiary

failures, accountability for wrongdoing has been limited

at best, and almost non-existent for command; and (2)

2 . I. Introduction

A Human Rights First Report

commanders have played a key role in undermining

chances for full accountability. In dozens of cases

documented here, grossly inadequate reporting,

investigation, and follow-through have left no one at all

responsible for homicides and other unexplained

deaths. Commanders have failed both to provide troops

clear guidance, and to take crimes seriously by

insisting on vigorous investigations. And command

responsibility itself . the law that requires commanders

to be held liable for the unlawful acts of their subordinates

about which they knew or should have known .

has been all but forgotten.

The failure to deal adequately with these cases has

opened a serious accountability gap for the U.S.

military and intelligence community, and has produced

a credibility gap for the United States . between

policies the leadership says it respects on paper, and

behavior it actually allows in practice. As long as the

accountability gap exists, there will be little incentive for

military command to correct bad behavior, or for civilian

leadership to adopt policies that follow the law. As long

as that gap exists, the problem of torture and abuse will

remain.

This report examines how cases of deaths in custody

have been handled. It is about how and why this

.accountability gap. between U.S. policy and practice

has come to exist. And it is about why ensuring that

officials up and down the chain of command bear

responsibility for detainee mistreatment should be a top

priority for the United States.

The cases behind these numbers have names and

faces. This report describes more than 20 cases in

detail, to illustrate both the failures in investigation and

in accountability. Among the cases is that of Manadel

al-Jamadi, whose death became public during the Abu

Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal when photographs

depicting prison guards giving the thumbs-up over his

body were released; to date, no U.S. military or

intelligence official has been punished criminally in

connection with Jamadi.s death.

The cases also include that of Abed Hamed Mowhoush,

a former Iraqi general beaten over days by U.S.

Army, CIA and other non-military forces, stuffed into a

sleeping bag, wrapped with electrical cord, and

suffocated to death. In the recently concluded trial of a

low-level military officer charged in Mowhoush.s death,

the officer received a written reprimand, a fine, and 60

days with his movements limited to his work, home,

and church.

And they include cases like that of Nagem Sadoon

Hatab, in which investigative failures have made

accountability impossible. Hatab, a 52-year-old Iraqi,

was killed while in U.S. custody at a holding camp

close to Nasiriyah. Although a U.S. Army medical

examiner found that Hatab had died of strangulation,

the evidence that would have been required to secure

accountability for his death . Hatab.s body . was

rendered unusable in court. Hatab.s internal organs

were left exposed on an airport tarmac for hours; in the

blistering Baghdad heat, the organs were destroyed;

the throat bone that would have supported the Army

medical examiner.s findings of strangulation was never

found.

Although policing crimes in wartime is always challenging,

government investigations into deaths in custody

since 2002 have been unacceptable. The cases

discussed in this report include incidents where deaths

went unreported, witnesses were never interviewed,

evidence was lost or mishandled, and record-keeping

was scattershot. They also include investigations that

were cut short as a result of decisions by commanders

. who are given the authority to decide whether and to

what extent to pursue an investigation . to rely on

incomplete inquiries, or to discharge a suspect before

an investigation can be completed. Given the extent of

the non-reporting, under-reporting, and lax record

keeping to date, it is likely that the statistics reported

here, if anything, under-count the number of deaths.

Command.s Responsibility . 3

A Human Rights First Report

Among our key findings:

detainees in the custody of their command, reported

the deaths only after a period of days and

sometimes weeks, or actively interfered in efforts to

pursue investigations;

collect useable evidence, or maintain

evidence that could be used for any subsequent

prosecution;

undermining chances for effective investigation or

appropriate prosecution;

have compromised chances for

accountability;

investigation restrictions have left CIA and Special

Forces essentially immune from accountability;

including the cause or circumstance of death,

in close to half the cases examined;

too late.

The military has taken some steps toward correcting

the failings identified here. Under public pressure

following the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs in

2004, the Army reopened over a dozen investigations

into deaths in custody and conducted multiple investigation

reviews; many of these identified serious flaws.

The Defense Department also .clarified. some existing

rules, reminding commanders that they were required

to report .immediately. the death of a detainee to

service criminal investigators, and barring release of a

body without written authorization from the relevant

investigation agency or the Armed Forces Medical

Examiner. It also made the performance of an autopsy

the norm, with exceptions made only by the Armed

Forces Medical Examiner. And the Defense Department

says that it is now providing pre-deployment

training on the Geneva Conventions and rules of

engagement to all new units to be stationed in Iraq and

responsible for guarding and processing detainees.

But these reforms are only first steps. They have not

addressed systemic flaws in the investigation of

detainee deaths, or in the prosecution and punishment

of those responsible for wrongdoing. Most important,

they have not addressed the role of those leaders who

have emerged as a pivotal part of the problem .

military and civilian command. Commanders are the

only line between troops in the field who need clear,

usable rules, and policy-makers who have provided

broad instructions since 2002 that have been at worst

unlawful and at best unclear. Under today.s military

justice system, commanders also have broad discretion

to insist that investigations into wrongdoing be pursued,

and that charges, when appropriate, be brought. And

commanders have a historic, legal, and ethical duty to

take responsibility for the acts of their subordinates. As

the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized since World

War II, commanders are responsible for the acts of

their subordinates if they knew or should have known

unlawful activity was underway, and yet did nothing to

correct or stop it. That doctrine of command responsibility

has yet to be invoked in a single prosecution

arising out of the .war on terror..

Closing this accountability gap will require, at a

minimum, a zero-tolerance approach to commanders

who fail to take steps to provide clear guidance, and

who allow unlawful conduct to persist on their watch.

Zero tolerance includes at least this:

4 . I. Introduction

A Human Rights First Report

implementation requires that the President clarify his

commitment to abide by the ban (which was called into

question by the President.s statement signing the bill

into law). It also requires the President to instruct all

relevant military and intelligence agencies involved in

detention and interrogation operations to review and

revise internal rules and legal guidance to make sure

they are in line with the statutory mandate.

regular reminders to command that abuse will not be

tolerated, and commanders should regularly give

troops the same, serious message. Relevant agencies

should welcome independent oversight . by Congress

and the American people . by establishing a centralized,

up-to-date, and publicly available collection of

information about the status of investigations and

prosecutions in torture and abuse cases (including trial

transcripts, documents, and evidence presented), and

all incidents of abuse. And the Defense and Justice

Departments should move forward promptly with longpending

actions against those involved in cases of

wrongful detainee death or abuse.

might include the implementation of a single, high-level

convening authority across the service branches for

allegations of detainee torture and abuse. Such a

convening authority would review and make decisions

about whom to hold responsible; bring uniformity,

certainty, and more independent oversight to the

process of discipline and punishment; and make

punishing commanders themselves more likely.

Such a commission could investigate and identify the

systemic causes of failures that lead to torture, abuse,

and wrongful death, and chart a detailed and specific

path going forward to make sure those mistakes never

happen again. The proposal for a commission has

been endorsed by a wide range of distinguished

Americans from Republican and Democratic members

of Congress to former presidents to leaders in the U.S.

military. We urge Congress to act without further delay.

Americans have come to understand. As a distinguished

group of retired generals and admirals put it in a

September 2004 letter to the President: .Understanding what

has gone wrong and what can be done to avoid systemic

failure in the future is essential not only to ensure that those

who may be responsible are held accountable for any wrongdoing,

but also to ensure that the effectiveness of the U.S.

military and intelligence operations is

not compromised by an atmosphere of permissiveness,

ambiguity, or confusion. This is fundamentally a

command responsibility.. It is the responsibility of

American leadership.

Command.s Responsibility . 5

A Human Rights First Report

Hossam Mowoush (in translation)

Son of Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush,

Killed in U.S. Custody November 26, 20031

Of the close to 100 deaths in U.S. custody in the global

least eight men, and as many as 12, were tortured to

military initially classified as due to .natural causes,.

and deaths that the military continues to classify as

.justified.. This chapter briefly reviews the facts of some

of these worst cases, and the consequences . or not .

for those involved.

In this report, we include any death of a detainee under effective

U.S. control as a .death in custody.. We adopt the definition of

.detainee. used by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command

(CID) . the Army.s agency for investigating crimes committed by

soldiers . .any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed

killed in the course of combat or as a result of injuries sustained

during combat, or persons shot at checkpoints when it is alleged

that they disobeyed orders to stop their vehicle. We do include

prisoners in U.S. military detention centers, as well as those who

have been killed while being interrogated in their homes, or shot at

the point of their capture, after surrendering to U.S. troops. Once a

person has been captured, the U.S. military or intelligence agency

assumes control over him, and can restrain him against his will. It is

under these circumstances that American law and values are most

acutely tested.

6 . II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force

A Human Rights First Report

Mohammed Mowoush (in translation), describing his

last sight of his father, Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed

Mowhoush. Killed in U.S. Custody November 26, 20036

Major General Abed Hamed

Mowhoush with a grandson

Abed Hamed Mowhoush turned himself over to U.S.

before U.S. forces captured ousted Iraqi leader

Saddam Hussein, and at a time when pressure on

Army intelligence to produce information was at its

height. At Forward Operating Base (.FOB.) Tiger,

where Mowhoush appeared, the U.S. Army had set up

a base camp and prison operations earlier in the year;

the facility was near the town of Al Qaim at the western

edge of Anbar province, about a mile from the Syrian

with about 1,000 soldiers from the 1st Squadron of the

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (.ACR.), based in Fort

included the detention and interrogation of captured

prisoners, a mission that took on added importance that

November, as U.S. forces picked up Iraqi men

and boys in the region in an effort to quell a rising

insurgency.

According to Chief

Warrant Officer

Lewis Welshofer,

who was deployed

to Iraq in March

2003 as part of the

military intelligence

on how to conduct

Welshofer described a captain.s memo he had received

in late August 2003, which stated that there were no

specific rules of engagement for interrogations in Iraq,

and that U.S. Army Central Command officials were still

Although specific rules were hard to come by, command

was clear that intelligence to date was

inadequate and, as Welshofer put it: .[t]hey were

captured detainees were to be considered .unprivileged

Command.s Responsibility . 7

A Human Rights First Report

had separately suggested meant detainees were not to

be afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions.

conflicts the United States would have considered

Soon after, a September 10, 2003 memo from Lt. Gen.

Ricardo S. Sanchez, then U.S. Army Commander of

the Coalition Joint Task Force in Iraq, underscored with

new specificity the confusion over the applicability of

that other countries might view certain practices as

inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions, General

Sanchez authorized such harsh interrogation techniques

as sleep and environmental manipulation, the

use of aggressive dogs, and the use of stress positions.

.stress positions. had never been explained in his Army

to his own devices to fill in the meaning of the term.

According to Welshofer, the Sanchez memo (disclosed

publicly for the first time in January 2006) was the only

guidance on permissible interrogation techniques in

By the time Mowhoush, 57, arrived at FOB Tiger in

mid-November, his four sons had been in U.S. custody

for approximately 11 days, held in a prison outside

forces made clear to the sons in the course of interrogations

that they had been arrested for the purpose of

According to the son, Mowhoush arrived at the base

But Mowhoush.s sons remained in detention; one of

them would later play a part in U.S. efforts to extract

from their father what information they could.

Chief Welshofer was among the first interrogators

Mowhoush would see. According to Welshofer, his

interrogation of Mowhoush on the day of Mowhoush.s

arrival on November 10 was limited to direct questions

. a two-hour affair that passed with little of consequence.

had begun to take a different approach. Welshofer took

Mowhoush, his hands bound, before an audience of

fellow detainees and slapped him . an attempt,

according to Welshofer, to show Mowhoush who was in

Still unsatisfied with Mowhoush.s answers in interrogation,

Welshofer.s unit brought Mowhoush with them

when they moved a few days later from FOB Tiger to a

The .Hotel. was a makeshift facility, set up to handle an

influx of Iraqi prisoners anticipated from sweeps

November 24, Welshofer called in interrogation

trial testimony, Welshofer engaged CIA and possibly

Army Special Forces personnel . together with a

.Scorpion. team of Iraqi paramilitary forces on the CIA

soldiers eventually recounted what they saw and

of the non-military forces .interrogate[d] Mowhoush and

guard at the Blacksmith Hotel, was standing outside the

interrogation room the night of November 24 when

some of the beatings were going on, and described

hearing the thudding sound of Mowhoush being hit. .It

wasn.t like they were hitting a wall,. said Loper, .[t]here

Army autopsy revealed the effects of the beatings:

Mowhoush had .massive. bruising and five broken

The next day, Welshofer interrogated Mowhoush again,

this time on the roof of the interrogation building. Here,

in the absence of any more specific instructions for

interrogation techniques, Welshofer reached back

beyond his basic training in the Army, to his own

service as a trainer at a military school in Hawaii where

U.S. service members are coached on what they might

military.s .SERE. courses (standing for Survival,

Evasion, Resistance, Escape) were based on studies

of North Korean and Vietnamese efforts to break

American prisoners; the courses aimed to subject

trainees to the brutal detention conditions they would

have faced at the hands of the United States. former

through prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, and

painful body positions; studies of the effects on troops

subjected to these techniques showed most suffering

from overwhelming stress, despair, and intense

anxiety, and some from hallucinations and delusions as

pointed to SERE training as the basis for some of the

harshest techniques authorized for use on detainees by

asked during his court martial whether anyone told him

8 . II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force

A Human Rights First Report

that SERE techniques were not to be used in Iraq,

With these techniques in his interrogator.s mind,

Mowhoush.s next session included having his hands

bound, being struck repeatedly on the back of his arms,

in the painful spot near the humerus, and being doused

others who later testified, drawn from the lessons of

Welshofer arranged for a short meeting between

Mowhoush and his youngest son, Mohammed, then 15

years old; Welshofer hoped the meeting would compel

later described Mowhoush as being moved to tears

though, the meeting was more than a conversation; in

interviews with Human Rights First, Mohammed

explained that U.S. personnel made Mowhoush believe

his son would be executed if he did not speak to their

satisfaction, and soldiers fired a bullet into the ground

near Mohammed.s head within earshot but just beyond

By November 26, Welshofer was ready to try yet

another technique . stuffing his subject into a sleeping

Welshofer had already proposed the sleeping bag

technique to his Company Commander, Major Jessica

testimony would make clear that the technique had

catastrophically ineffective in Mowhoush.s case. During

his final interrogation, Mowhoush was shoved head-first

into the sleeping bag, wrapped with electrical cord, and

rolled from his stomach to his back. Welshofer sat on

At one point, according to Loper, Mowhoush started to

clinch and kick his legs, .almost like he was being

dying (according to the autopsy report) of asphyxia due

The day after his death, the U.S. military issued a press

release stating that Mowhoush had died of natural

Despite the brutality of Mowhoush.s death, and the

likely involvement of officials from the CIA, only one

individual, Chief Welshofer, has faced court martial for

his actions. Over the course of a 6-day trial in Colorado,

more than two years after Mowhoush.s final

interrogation, a 6-member Army jury heard testimony

that civilian leaders in the Administration had instructed

that Geneva Convention protections against cruel and

inhuman treatment would not apply in this conflict; that

the U.S. commanding general in Iraq, General Sanchez,

had authorized .stress positions. in

own commanding officer, Major Voss, stuffing a

detainee in a sleeping bag was widely understood to

testimony, some closed to the public, of the involvement

of the CIA and Special Forces, as well as of the

documents had long noted this involvement: .[T]he

circumstances surrounding the death are further

complicated due to Mowhoush being interrogated and

reportedly beaten by members of a Special Forces

team and other government agency (OGA) employees

tearful testimony . that he was trying to be a loyal

Although he was originally charged with murder,

Welshofer was convicted of lesser charges: negligent

conviction carried a possible sentence of more than

three years in prison, but Welshofer received a far

more lenient sentence from the Army jury: a written

reprimand, a $6,000 fine, and 60 days with movement

The others implicated in Mowhoush.s death have faced

less. Chief Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams and

Specialist Jerry Loper, who were present during

Mowhoush.s interrogation, were originally charged with

murder, but the charges were later dropped. In

exchange for testimony against Welshofer, Williams will

receive administrative (not criminal) punishment, and

Loper will be tried in a summary proceeding rather than

William Sommer, had his murder charge dropped as

charges have been brought (nor are charges expected

to be brought according to law enforcement and

intelligence officials) against CIA personnel, and

Special Forces Command determined (without public

explanation) that none of their personnel were guilty of

Command.s Responsibility . 9

A Human Rights First Report

the Military Intelligence unit responsible for interrogating

Mowhoush, was reprimanded for her failure to

provide adequate supervision, but she was not charged

2002-2004 (including the period of Mowhoush.s death)

hearing in Welshofer.s case, Teeples testified to his

belief that the sleeping bag technique was approved

press charges against Welshofer, despite the view of

Teeples does not appear to have been disciplined in

connection with Mowhoush.s death.

The involvement of special military forces and members of other governmental agencies in the interrogation and detention of detainees

has raised serious concerns regarding proper investigative procedures and accountability. The Army.s CID has jurisdiction over crimes

committed by all U.S. Army personnel; CID.s Field Investigative Units are trained to conduct investigations that implicate classified activities,

alternative investigative procedures have sometimes been used where Special Forces were involved. For example, in one case involving

Brigadier General Richard Formica completed an investigation into allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq by Special Forces personnel, but

Deaths in which the CIA has been implicated (alone or jointly with Army Special Forces or Navy SEALS) have presented additional

contract worker associated with the CIA has to date faced criminal charges for his role in the death of detainees. Further, the CIA has

Manadel al-Jamadi, CIA representatives protested questions regarding the position of al-Jamadi.s body when he died, and the role of

Department of Justice is unlikely to bring criminal charges against CIA employees for cases involving the death, torture, or other abuse of

detainees, including the deaths of al-Jamadi and General Abed Hamed Mowhoush and a detainee whose name has not been made public

decisions known.

Reports of internal efforts at the CIA to address detainee abuse by agents are less than encouraging. After completing a review in spring

2004 of CIA detention and interrogation procedures in Afghanistan and Iraq, the CIA Inspector General made 10 recommendations for

10 . II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force

A Human Rights First Report

Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Jameel, a former officer in

the Iraqi army, was detained at a Forward Operating

Base near Al Asad, Iraq, and died there on January 9,

According to Pentagon documents obtained by the

interrogation by Army Special Forces soldiers, he

allegedly lunged and grabbed the shirt of one soldier

subsequent interrogation session, Jameel refused his

interrogators. orders to stay quiet, and was put in a

.stress position.: he was tied by his hands to the top of

Jameel had been .lifted to his feet by a baton held to

his throat,. causing a throat injury that .contributed. to

According to an autopsy conducted by the U.S. Armed

Forces Medical Examiner.s Office and reviewed by

Human Rights First, Jameel.s death was a homicide

force injuries, the hanging position, and the obstruction

The autopsy detailed evidence of additional abuse

Jameel suffered: a fractured and bleeding throat, more

than a dozen fractured ribs, internal bleeding, and

numerous lacerations and contusions all over his

Among the findings of the Army.s criminal investigators

was that Jameel .was shackled to the top of a doorframe

with a gag in his mouth at the time he lost

investigators found probable cause to recommend

prosecution of 11 soldiers . including members of the

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (the same Regiment

involved in the death of Iraqi Major General Mowhoush),

as well as the Special Forces personnel . for

charges including negligent homicide, assault, and

Special Forces Command declined to follow the

recommendations, and investigation findings of any

Upon reviewing the case, Army commanders decided

that the soldiers. actions were at all points a lawful

the commanders. decisions are unclear. The same

person, Colonel David A. Teeples, was commander of

the 3rd Armored Cavalry at the time of Jameel.s death

Because the killing was found to be justified, no

The Armed Forces Medical Examiner.s report on

autopsy number ME 04-309 reads: .This approximately

27 year-old male civilian, presumed Iraqi national, died

in US custody approximately 72 hours after being

apprehended. By report, physical force was required

during his initial apprehension during a raid. During his

confinement, he was hooded, sleep deprived, and

subjected to hot and cold environmental conditions,

including the use of cold water on his body and

minor injuries, abrasions and contusions. and .blunt

the cause of death and manner of death .undetermined.

The autopsy, which was not conducted until three

accounts pieced together in subsequent inquiries.

Command.s Responsibility . 11

A Human Rights First Report

Mohammed was apparently apprehended by members

of Navy SEAL Team 7, which was operating with the

SEALS then brought Mohammed to an Army base

Mohammed subjected him to hooding, sleep deprivation,

and exposure to extreme temperatures.all

methods that deviate from the techniques described in

the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation FM

34-52, but that were approved by the Secretary of

A Pentagon official relates that after an interrogation,

2004.

We know very little about Mohammed.s last hours and

the military has released even less information about its

investigation into his death and charges brought

against those responsible. The most recent press

reports indicate that as many as three Navy SEALS

were charged with abusing Mohammed; charges

included assault with intent to cause death and serious

bodily harm, assault with a dangerous weapon,

maltreatment of detainees, obstruction of justice, and

dereliction of duty. Murder or manslaughter charges

were not brought, reportedly because of lack of

evidence.

of Defense on January 26, 2006 for an update on the

status and outcome of any prosecutions in Mohammed

.s case; as of February 10, 2006 we had received

no response.

108 Charles Graner next to

the corpse of

Manadel al-Jamadi

Dr. Michael Baden, Chief Forensic Pathologist, New York

State Police, giving his opinion of the cause of Manadel

al-Jamadi.s death114

According to press accounts, Manadel al-Jamadi, an

Iraqi citizen of unknown age, was captured and tortured

to death in Abu Ghraib by Navy SEALS and CIA

personnel working closely together; he died on

captured al-Jamadi took turns punching, kicking and

striking him with their rifles after he was detained in a

small area in the Navy camp at Baghdad International

guard later told CIA investigators that after al-Jamadi

was stripped and doused with water a CIA interrogator

threatened him, saying: .I.m going to barbecue you if

reported that the CIA interrogator leaned into al-

Jamadi.s chest with his forearm, and found a pressure

report states that another CIA security guard

.recalled al-Jamadi saying, .I.m dying. I.m dying,.

translated by the interpreter, to which the interrogator

replied, .I don.t care,. and, .You.ll be wishing you were

When al-Jamadi was taken to Abu Ghraib, he was not

entered on the prison rolls . he was a .ghost. detainee.

shower room where,

military police

testified, a non-covert

CIA interrogator

(identified as Mark

to shackle al-Jamadi

to a window about five

feet from the floor, in

a posture known as

the .Palestinian

hanging,. making it

impossible for him to kneel or sit without hanging from

summoned guards to re-position al-Jamadi, claiming

arrived they found al-Jamadi.s corpse, hooded with a

sandbag and with his arms handcuffed behind his back

and still shackled to the window . which was now

blood gushed from al-Jamadi.s mouth as the guards

released him and his arms were almost coming out of

. II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force

A Human Rights First Report

Jamadi.s body be held overnight and stated that he

morning the .body was removed from Abu Ghraib on a

litter, to make it appear as if he were only ill, so as not

to draw the attention of the Iraqi guards and detainees.

Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal, after photographs

of prison guards giving the thumbs-up over his body

U.S. forces did not release al-Jamadi.s body to the

International Committee of the Red Cross (.ICRC.) until

February 11, 2004, more than three months after his

mortuary the same day, but one expert from Baghdad.s

main forensic medico-legal institute said that the

refrigeration of al-Jamadi.s body for that period made it

difficult for the Iraqis to establish the real cause of

military five days after al-Jamadi.s death had found that

the cause of death was .Blunt Force Injuries Complicated

report noted al-Jamadi had six broken ribs and a

who later examined the autopsy report at the request of

a lawyer for one of the SEALS and was informed of al-

Jamadi.s shackling position gave the opinion that the

likely cause of his death was the hanging position,

rather than beatings inflicted prior to his arrival at Abu

State police chief forensic pathologist, .asphyxia is

Donahue, the president of the American Academy of

Forensic Scientists, who reviewed the autopsy at the

request of National Public Radio, gave a similar

opinion, saying: .When you combine [the hanging

position] with having a hood over your head and having

the broken ribs, it.s fairly clear that this death was

caused by asphyxia because he couldn.t breathe

During a later court martial proceeding, one Navy SEAL

testified that he and his fellow SEALS were not trained

testified they trained the SEALS to treat detainees

humanely, one SEAL stated: .The briefing I remember

is that these [prisoners] did not fall under the Geneva

Convention because they were not enemy combatants.

Of the 10 Navy personnel . 9 SEALS and one sailor .

accused by Navy prosecutors of being involved in al-

criminal felony conviction, nonjudicial or administrative

punishment is usually imposed by an accused.s

commanding officer for minor disciplinary offenses, and

formally prosecuted in the case was Navy SEAL

Lieutenant Andrew K. Ledford, the commander of the

SEAL platoon, who was charged with dereliction of

duty, assault, making a false statement to investigators,

whether to prosecute CIA personnel for possible

interrogator, Mark Swanner, continues to work for the

criminally in connection with al-Jamadi.s death. Human

Rights First asked the Department of Defense on

January 26, 2006 the status of the al-Jamadi case; as

of February 10, we had received no response.

Nagem Sadoon Hatab, a 52-year-old Iraqi, was killed in

U.S. custody at a Marine-run temporary holding camp

including allegedly .karate-kicking. him while he stood

developed severe diarrhea, and was covered in

Hatab was stripped and examined by a medic, who

base commander.s order, a clerk with no training in

handling prisoners dragged Hatab by his neck to an

outdoor holding area, to make room for a new prisoner.

150

The clerk later testified to the ease with which he was

able to drag the prisoner: Hatab.s body, covered by

was then left on the ground, uncovered and exposed in

the heat of the sun. He was found dead sometime after

Command.s Responsibility . 13

A Human Rights First Report

Hatab found that he had died of strangulation . a victim

Hatab.s ribs were broken and his back, buttocks, legs

The guards at the detention center to which Hatab had

been brought were ill-prepared for their duty at best.

The previous commander of the facility, Major William

Vickers, would later testify that none of the approximately

30 Marines at the camp had been trained to run

a jail before their assignment: .Not then or even

guard role after Army and other Marine units refused

Paulus, had been in that position for a week before

Hatab.s death, and had spent only a day observing the

predecessor, Major Vickers, added that the camp had

originally been designated a temporary holding facility,

where Marines would interrogate prisoners for a day or

were kept for longer, resulting in overcrowding and

The treatment of Hatab.s body did not improve after his

death. A Navy surgeon, Dr. Ray Santos, testified that

when Hatab.s body arrived at the morgue: .It kept

The U.S. Army Medical Examiner, Colonel Kathleen

Ingwersen, who performed the autopsy, reportedly

acknowledged that Hatab.s body had undergone

decomposition because it was stored in an unrefrigerated

a later court martial indicated that a container of

Hatab.s internal organs was left exposed on an airport

tarmac for hours; in the blistering Iraqi heat, the organs

larynx were later found in medical labs in Washington,

D.C. and Germany, due to what the Medical Examiner,

Colonel Ingwersen, described as a .miscommunication.

couldn.t recall whether she removed the bone from the

piece of evidence, because it supported the Army

Medical Examiner.s finding that Hatab died of strangulation.

167

Although eight Marines were initially charged in the

Paulus, who ordered Hatab dragged by his neck and

permitted him to lie untreated in the sun, was originally

charged with a number of offenses, including negligent

homicide, while Sergeant Gary P. Pittman was charged

with five counts of assault for beating prisoners

(including Hatab) and two counts of dereliction of

however, in part because of the lax handling of the

proceedings, Colonel Robert Chester, ruled that the

autopsy findings and other medical evidence .

evidence which was also Hatab.s remains . could not

be considered, because it had been lost or destroyed

judge.s decision eliminated the possibility that prosecutors

could win conviction on the most serious charges

they had brought. In addition, at Sergeant Pittman.s

court martial, prosecutors acknowledged that the

military had either lost or destroyed photos of Hatab

As a result, prosecutors were unable to win conviction

on any charges relating to culpability for Hatab.s death:

Paulus was convicted of dereliction of duty and

maltreatment for ordering a subordinate to drag Hatab

by the neck, and for allowing Hatab to remain unmonitored

abusing Hatab, though he was sentenced for assaulting

Christian Hernandez (who dragged Hatab by the neck),

including negligent homicide, were dropped, and the

cases against the other Marines similarly did not

reduction in rank from a lance corporal to a private first

class in exchange for his testimony. But because the

demotion was a non-judicial punishment, and the basis

for it is not public, the precise contours of his culpability

14 . II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force

A Human Rights First Report

On June 18, 2003, Abdul Wali turned himself in to

soldiers at an Army firebase in Asadabad, Afghanistan,

the governor of the province where the base is located

accompanied Wali and initially acted as his interpreter

U.S. interrogator was so aggressive in questioning Wali

The man who interrogated Abdul Wali was not a

soldier; David Passaro was a former Army Ranger who

Reportedly convinced that Wali had information about

weapons that would be used to attack U.S. personnel,

of these sessions, the U.S. government alleges,

Passaro beat Wali, both with his hands and with a

who apparently suffered from poor health, did not

Army criminal investigators looked into Wali.s death,

found that no Army personnel were implicated and

referred the case to the Department of Justice for

federal grand jury in the Eastern District of North

As of February 2006, the case against Passaro was

moving toward trial, with the government and defense

engaged in arguments about the defenses that would

be allowed, and which witnesses would testify in the

position at trial will be that abusive questioning

techniques were not criminal because they were

consistent with authorized interrogation policies, and

that his actions were legally justified under a series of

Executive Branch memos that appear to permit

No one has been charged with murder or manslaughter

in connection with Wali.s death. Human Rights First

asked the Department of Defense on January 26, 2006

for any update on the status of Wali.s case; as of

February 10, 2006 we had received no response.

Habibullah died on the night of December 3, 2002,

because of abuses inflicted upon him by U.S. soldiers

Habibullah was captured by an Afghan warlord and,

was brought to the Bagram detention facility on the last

Military Police Company at that facility reportedly

subjected detainees held at the base to peroneal

strikes .a knee strike aimed at a cluster of nerves on

the side of the thigh, meant to quickly disable an

he gave Habibullah five peroneal strikes for being

Immediately upon his arrival, Habibullah was placed in

an isolation cell and shackled to the ceiling by his

allowed him to sit on the floor because his knees would

not bend enough for him to sit on a chair; as Habibullah

One day later, Habibullah was found hanging from the

felt the almost-incapacitated prisoner spit on him; the

soldier yelled and began beating Habibullah while he

The U.S.-conducted autopsy found that Habibullah had

died of an embolism . a blood clot, almost certainly the

product of the repeated beatings, had traveled through

Command.s Responsibility . 15

A Human Rights First Report

his bloodstream and clogged the arteries leading to his

Command looked into the death, and initially recommended

investigators. findings it was impossible to determine

who was responsible for Habibullah.s injuries because

maintain critical evidence in the case. A sample of

Habibullah.s blood was kept in the butter dish of

investigators. office refrigerator until the office was

Press interest in Habibullah.s death.and that of

Dilawar, another detainee who died a week later at the

same facility.sparked renewed progress in the

criminal investigation, resulting in charges against the

almost two years after Habibullah.s death, criminal

investigators recommended that charges be brought

against 27 soldiers for their roles in the death of

Dilawar and against 15 of the same soldiers for the

death of Habibullah, including .two captains, the

military intelligence officer in charge of the interrogation

group, and the reservist commander of the military

To date, less than half of the soldiers against whom

charges were recommended .12 out of 27. have

actually been prosecuted for their roles in the deaths of

only four of these individuals were given

sentences that included confinement, and the sentences

January 2006, after a pre-trial inquiry, the Army

dropped its criminal case against the only officer

charged (with lying to investigators and dereliction of

duties) in connection with the deaths, Military Police

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Berg, the Army judge

who oversaw the pretrial inquiry, criticized the prosecution

for not presenting sufficient evidence to support

military policy company had not been adequately

trained before deployment for its mission at the Bagram

actual mission that the 377th [Military Police Company]

anticipated that it would assume upon arrival in theater

. . . . Much of the 377th.s training was described as

.notional. in that soldiers were asked to imagine or

pretend that they had the proper equipment for training

been charged with murder or voluntary manslaughter

Dilawar was the second detainee killed in a week at the

Afghan citizen whose case similarly became the

was driving his taxi past U.S. Camp Salerno when he

was stopped and his car searched by a local Afghan

then taken into custody as a suspect in a rocket

later suspected of having launched the attack

Dilawar was brought to the Bagram detention facility on

labeled a .noncompliant. detainee by U.S. soldiers, and

was subjected to the same

kind of peroneal strikes that

eventually contributed to the

During one of the beatings

by soldiers, Dilawar cried

According to a U.S. soldier,

U.S. military personnel found

these cries funny and hit

Dilawar repeatedly to hear

hour period, one soldier

estimated that Dilawar was

Dilawar

16 . II. Homicides: Death by Torture, Abuse or Force

A Human Rights First Report

According to an interpreter, during his fourth interrogation

session on December 8, Dilawar was unable to

comply with commands to keep his hands above his

During the same interrogation, two interrogators

shoved Dilawar against a wall when he was unable to

sit in a .chair. position against the walls because of the

one of the soldiers ordered Dilawar to be chained to the

December 10, Dilawar could not obey the orders the

interrogators gave him to stand in stress positions and

The official autopsy, conducted three days after his

death, showed that Dilawar.s legs had suffered

.extensive muscle breakdown and grossly visible

damage was .nearly circumferential,. from below the

skin down to the bone. The manner of death was found

Criminal investigation into his death, and that of

renewed investigation also cast into stark relief the

flaws in the original investigative efforts: agents had not

interviewed the commanders of the soldiers responsible

for the deaths, failed to interview an interrogator

who had witnessed most of Dilawar.s questioning

during his detention, and mishandled critical evidence.

investigation . and at the individual initiative of at least

one soldier . that investigators finally took statements.

had previously been overlooked had crucial information,

including an eyewitness account of an interrogator

apparently choking Dilawar by pulling on his hood, and

that .most [soldiers at the base] were convinced that

The status of prosecutions of the soldiers responsible

for Dilawar.s death is described above.

Sajid Kadhim Bori al-Bawi, an Iraqi actor, was shot and

killed in his home in Baghdad early in the morning of

soldiers raided the house by crashing through the gate

were bound and held on their knees and the women

and children were kept in the living room while he was

troops took with them a robed and hooded man, and

when the family went into the room where he had been

questioned, they found al-Bawi.s corpse, stuffed behind

been shot five times: in the leg, throat, armpit, and

Sajid Kadhim Bori al-Bawi.s

son holds a portrait

of his father

reported in its initial public statements about the

shooting that al-Bawi had

grabbed a U.S. soldier.s

pistol, switched the safety

off, and the soldier then

fired five shots in selfdefense.

military.s statements

became the subject of

dispute. An Iraqi medical

examiner who examined

the body found that the

shots had been fired from

two different directions; al-

Bawi.s family reported that

they found two kinds of

casings in the room where

investigators only began their investigation a month

after al-Bawi.s death, when an investigation was

requested by the military.s Detainee Assessment Task

.s Responsibility . 17

A Human Rights First Report

between the findings of the administrative investigation

and allegations by al-Bawi.s family and the medical

scant four hours reviewing the findings of the administrative

investigation, did not attempt any independent

News reports detailing the family.s allegations were

included in the file, but the only change the criminal

investigator made to the initial probe was to correct the

restated the conclusion that the killing was justified and

The lack of any independent investigation into al-Bawi.s

family.s allegations . or any investigation beyond a

review of the administrative findings . is troubling. At a

minimum, there is a disconnect between the administrative

finding that one soldier fired all the shots with

was shot from two directions with two different calibers

Al-Bawi.s family reportedly was offered $1,500 in

compensation by military officials, conditioned on their

agreeing that the United States has no responsibility for

Obeed Hethere Radad was shot to death on September

11, 2003, in his detention cell in an American

and administrative investigations were conducted into

Specialist Juba Martino-Poole, stated during the

administrative investigation that he had shot Radad

without giving any verbal warning because Radad was

.fiddling. with his hand restraints and standing close to

The administrative investigation found .sufficient cause

to believe. Martino-Poole violated the Army.s use of

force policy and the base.s particular directives on the

use of deadly force with which Radad could be

charged; the administrative investigation recommended

a criminal investigation be initiated to determine

there was inadequate clarity on the use of weapons

and force with regard to detainee operations at the

base, and noted in particular the lack of any written

also criticized the location of weapons within the

detention facilities, and the insufficient numbers of

who later reviewed the administrative investigation

found it legally insufficient